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Inflation has sequence risk too

You already know sequence-of-returns risk. Two people retire with the same average return over 30 years. One hits a crash in year 2, the other in year 28. Same average, very different endings. The order of the returns decides whether the plan holds up, not just their size. That idea has a cousin. It works the same way for inflation, and almost no retirement calculator will show it to you.

The part you already know

Bad years come earlyBad years come late

An identical set of 30 yearly returns applied in forward vs reversed order, with a fixed annual withdrawal. Same average return and total spending; opposite endings.

When a bad run of returns lands early, you sell more of the portfolio while it is down, before it ever compounds. The same losses arriving late hit a portfolio that already grew. Identical average return, different outcome.

Now swap returns for inflation

Inflation has an order too. Two retirements can average the same inflation over 40 years and still end up worlds apart, depending on when it hit.

Here is the reflex that gets people into trouble: stocks protect you from inflation, so I am covered. It is half right. The missing half is the problem.

Do stocks actually protect against inflation?

Over the very long run, mostly. Year to year, which is the horizon a near-retiree actually feels, not really. We looked at 124 years of returns across 24 developed markets, using the Dimson, Marsh and Staunton dataset. We sorted every period by how much inflation it carried, then measured what stocks returned after inflation.

High-inflation year
−4.4%
typical (median) real stock return
Low-inflation year
+6.9%
typical (median) real stock return
Hedge arrives by
~20 yrs
gap shrinks ~8 pts → ~0
Low inflationMediumHigh inflation

Mean annualized realequity return, developed markets bucketed into inflation terciles. Low, medium and high are the bottom, middle and top third of years by inflation (the high third is roughly above 4%/yr, the low third below ~2%/yr). Overlapping windows. Source: Dimson, Marsh & Staunton, UBS Global Investment Returns Yearbook. 24 developed markets, 1900–2024; hyperinflation years (>25%/yr) excluded.

In high-inflation years the typical real stock return was about −4%. Stocks lost ground in exactly the years you wanted them to hold it. That is the same perverse short-run link Eugene Fama and G. William Schwert documented back in 1977: they found U.S. stock returns fell in real terms as inflation rose. The hedge is real, but it is slow: the penalty for high inflation falls from roughly 8 percentage points over a single year to almost nothing over twenty. Stretch the horizon and the relationship flips. Boudoukh and Richardson found it turns positive by about the five-year mark, close to one-for-one. Stocks keep pace with inflation eventually.

Why timing is the whole story

If the hedge takes two decades to arrive, then inflation that shows up early in retirement lands before the portfolio has the time it needs. Drag the slider below. The average inflation and the average return stay fixed. Only the timing moves.

Avg inflation
3.5% /yr
Avg return
6.0% /yr
Withdrawal
3.8% real
Horizon
40 yrs
Inflation hits earlysame 40-yr total either wayInflation hits late
Ending purchasing power
$537,516
PLAN HELD UP
Inflation, year by year
What the plan is worth, in today’s dollars

One illustrative scenario. Average inflation, average return, and the withdrawal are all held fixed; only when the inflation arrives changes.

Same total inflation, same average return, same withdrawal. When it lands late, the plan finishes with room to spare. Pull it early and the plan runs dry, years before the math would have averaged out.

Inflation timing is its own risk

It is tempting to treat all inflation as one thing, but two different things about it can sink a plan. One is the level: inflation running high for the whole retirement, so your costs steadily outpace the portfolio. The other is the order: even inflation that averages out to something ordinary can ruin a plan if its worst years land at the wrong time. The slider above isolates the second one, holding the level fixed and moving only the timing. The damage is worst when a burst of inflation arrives while the balance is still small and your withdrawals are already climbing, before the portfolio has compounded into a cushion that could absorb it.

A single “expected inflation” assumption captures neither cleanly. It pins the level to one number, and by using an average it throws the order away entirely. Two plans handed the same expected-inflation figure can carry very different real risk, depending on how that inflation actually shows up.

Which kind is your plan carrying?

This is the part a single inflation number cannot answer. When we run a plan through a thousand historical futures, we take every future that ran dry and ask what single change would have saved it. Returns like the surviving scenarios saw? Lower inflation? Or, the interesting one here: the exact same inflation, just in a different order?

Why this plan ran dry: a conservative plan (2.8% withdrawals, 50/50 mix, 40-year horizon), 1,000 simulated futures
117of 1,000 futures
ran dry
High inflation40%
Inflation ran above what this plan's surviving scenarios saw
Early inflation22%
Inflation ran hot early, before the portfolio could grow; the same inflation later would have survived
Weak early returns21%
Poor returns landed early; the same returns later would have survived
Weak returns16%
Returns ran below what this plan's surviving scenarios saw
Mixed causes2%
No single change would have saved this scenario
Percentages are shares of the 117 failed scenarios.

Derived simulation output (counterfactual failure attribution) for an illustrative conservative plan, not a forecast. For each failed future, the simulator asks what single change would have saved it: conditions like the plan’s surviving scenarios saw, or the same series in a different order. About 61% of failures are attributed to inflation, and 22% to early inflation alone, the second-largest single cause here.

This is a deliberately careful plan, drawing just 2.8% a year, and it still fails in 117 of 1,000 futures. When it does, markets are rarely the villain: over 60% of the failures are attributed to inflation, and more than a fifth to early inflation alone, the second-largest single cause. Hand those futures the same inflation later instead, change nothing else, and the plan survives. Change the withdrawal rate or the asset mix and the picture changes with it. That fingerprint is what tells you which hedge actually helps your plan.

Run your plan through 1,000 futures →

What it comes down to

The years right around retirement are the exposed ones, but the classic buffer needs one correction: it has to hold its value in real terms. Long bonds are the worst asset in an inflation surge; treasury bills and floating-rate deposits reprice with inflation, which is the other half of what Fama and Schwert found. The cleanest hedge is inflation-linked bonds matched to your early withdrawals, but Canada stopped issuing Real Return Bonds in 2022, so the practical lever here is deferring CPP or OAS, buying more indexed income that inflation cannot erode. And the most direct move is to cap the inflation raise in a hot year, so your spending doesn’t climb while the balance is still small.

An average inflation assumption cannot tell you which of these risks your plan is carrying, because the average hides the order, and the order is what gets you.

Sequence-of-returns risk taught a generation of retirees that when matters, not only how much. Inflation deserves the same caution.

Further reading

This idea already has a name in retirement-planning circles: sequence-of-inflation risk. Justin Fitzpatrick of Income Lab laid out the case that planning tools wrongly hold inflation fixed while varying returns, in “How Sequence-Of-Inflation Risk Impacts Retirees” (also on Kitces.com). Those pieces use U.S. history; what we add here is the cross-country, century-long picture and the mechanism behind it: the equity inflation hedge is real, but slow.

The short-run result is older still. Fama & Schwert, “Asset Returns and Inflation” (Journal of Financial Economics, 1977), showed common stocks were negatively related to inflation, the opposite of a hedge. Fama later argued (“Stock Returns, Real Activity, Inflation, and Money,” 1981) that this link is largely a proxy for inflation’s negative tie to real economic activity, rather than a direct effect. A useful caveat against reading too much causation into the correlation.

For the long-run half, Boudoukh & Richardson, “Stock Returns and Inflation: A Long-Horizon Perspective” (American Economic Review, 1993), show the relation is roughly zero at one year but positive and near one-for-one at five: the hedge is a horizon effect, not an on/off switch. Anari & Kolari (2001) and the cointegration literature reach the same long-run conclusion. The dissent worth knowing: Bekaert & Wang, “Inflation risk and the inflation risk premium” (Economic Policy, 2010), argue that hedging inflation with stocks and bonds is harder and less reliable than the long-run averages suggest.